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STRUGGLING FOR A CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE 
ON THE CONTEMPORARY SOVIET UNION 
By James E. Will 
Dr. James E. Will (Methodist) is professor of systematic theology at Garrett­
Evangelical Theological Seminary in Evanston, Illinois. He is a frequent contributor 
to OPREE and serves on the Advisory Editorial Board. This articles was previously 
published in Christian Social Action, Vol. 4, No. 6 (June 19,  1 99 1 ), pp. 25-29 and is 
reprinted here with the permission of the editor. 
This article was requested as an "analysis" of recent events in the continuing Soviet 
struggle for freedom. I have not been able to bring my thought to that level of clarity. To 
.\ 
analyze so complex a social process requires sufficient conceptual �bntrol of the major 
constituent factors that one can understand the pattern of their causal interaction. The Soviet 
Union is the most diverse of the large societies in our world religiously, ethnically, and 
linguistically - - even more diverse than the U.S.A. Those in North America who dare to 
analyze its very complex contemporary dynamics seem to know either much more or less than 
I do. The best I can do as a more average American who has had a frequent opportunity 
to visit the Soviet Union as a churchman, and has tried to understand it as a theologian 
concerned for peace during the last twenty-five years, is to share my struggle to escape an 
ideological perspective while seeking a Christian perspective. 
Among those who know more about the Soviet Union than I is Alan Geyer. Those who 
want to strengthen their capacity for understanding what is happening in that society should 
read his Christianity and the Superpowers: Religion and History in U.S. - U.S.S.R .  Relations 
(Abingdon, 1 990). In a paper read to the American Society of Christian Ethics in January 
1 990, Professor Geyer wrote: 
The virtue of truthfulness has been very hard to come by in U.S.--Soviet 
relations. The Cold War has been waged with vicious strategies of disinformation on 
both sides. For many years, anti-American propaganda in Soviet rhetoric and media 
has been outrageously crude. But the problem of truthfulness is hardly one-sided. 
George Kennan has exposed the "primitivism" of American propaganda against the 
U.S.S.R.: its "endless series of distortions and oversimplifications," its "systematic 
dehumanization" of military capabilities, its "monotonous misrepresentation" of the 
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Soviet people, and its "reckless application of the double standard to the judgment of 
Soviet conduct and our own."1 
Mr. Kennan has been one of the few North Americans who has known enough of the Soviet 
Union to be trusted to make an analysis, both when he urged "containment" of Stalinism in 
the 1 940s and "detente" in the 1 980s. But for many others, I fear that adequate truthfulness 
is still hard to come by in understanding our Soviet neighbors even in this post-cold war 
epoch. 
My ten visits to the Soviet Union from 1 968 to 1 990 have enabled some insight into the 
urban culture of some of its major cities: Leningrad, Moscow, Odessa, Tallinn and Tbilisi, 
but almost nothing of its rural and village life. I know the Methodists in Tallinn, Estonia, 
best, but there are only a few thousand of them, plus a few more I have heard and read 
about in Moldavia and Siberia. The Lutherans in the Baltic states and the Evangelical 
Christian Baptist Union are not unknown. Some Russian and Georgian Orthodox have 
ecumenically opened their life to me, though I am too Protestant fully to understand them. 
But I know almost nothing directly of the Buddhist, Jewish, and Muslim communities in the 
Soviet Union, and the Marxist-Leninist philosophy of their government I have tried to 
understand is now everywhere in disarray and dispute even amongst those who still call 
themselves communists. 
I have recently observed wit great gratitude and some astonishment the transformation 
of the repression and stagnation I first experienced in 1968. The warning of the Methodist 
Superintendent Kuum when I first preached in Tallinn in 1 97 1 ,  that someone in the 
congregation would report on what I said to the government, no longer needed to be given 
by Superintendent Parnamets in 1990, or even f985. There is no longer the terrible distance 
between public speech and private conversation that used to be so deeply troublesome. 
Christians and others may now seek and speak what they understand to be the truth even in 
the public arena. But I also have been touched by concern, even fear, of some of what I 
recently saw and heard in 1 988 and 1 990: especially the ethnocentrism, nationalism, even 
xenophobia and hatred. How is one to "analyze" so complex a set of dynamics? For most of 
us, a reticence born of humility seems to be the first dimension of a Christian perspective. 
This perspective engenders a degree of skepticism about some of the analyses we receive 
from our government and through our media. Representative Steny Hoyer, who chairs the 
U.S. Congress' Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, has an important role in 
what is better known as the 'Helsinki process'. He appears to be a well-meaning participant 
in what has proven to be one of the most creative, liberative processes in the last fifteen 
1The quotations are from Kennan's book, The Nuclear Delusion: Soviet-American Relations in 
the Atomic Age, 1 983. 
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years in Europe and North America. While addressing the parliament of Latvia in mid­
February 1991, in what he said was his "first trip to the Baltic states," he nevertheless claimed 
that "our presence here symbolizes our commitment to your cause." One must wonder, 
however, how well he understood their cause on his first visit, especially when he went on 
to identify it with ill!! cause as defined in President Bush's recent rhetoric during the Gulf 
war about "a new world order." Speaking ten days later at a conference in the University of 
Virginia, he expressed more definitively his political judgment about recent events in the 
Soviet Union: 
Although most Eastern countries have steered a steady course, recent events 
in the Baltic States demonstrate how much work remains to be done before the Soviet 
Union becomes, as President Gorbachev has said it must, a rule of law state. Many 
of the commitments freely undertaken in Copenhagen (CSCE Conference on the 
Human Dimension, June 1990) have been tragically violated by the Soviet government. 
American politicians are seldom reticent about their judgments of the Soviet Union's 
violence and violations. It may no longer be an 'evil empire'. but it remains at least a 
naughty empire. We could spend the rest of this article analyzing the elements of 
Representative Hoyer's judgment, though we shall not. But we must at least note that 
President Gorbachev, along with President Bush and the heads of state/government of all 34 
states inn the CSCE, signed the Charter of Paris for a New Europe on November 21, 1990. 
It commits the Soviet and all other signatory governments to democratic government "based 
on the will of the people," founded on "respect for the human person and the rule of law." 
It contains the very important provision that "the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious 
identity of national minorities will be protected and that persons belonging to national 
minorities have the right freely to express, preserve and develop that identity without any 
discrimination and in full equality before the law." It is exactly this that Representative 
Hoyer finds the Soviet government "tragically violated." · 
There can be no doubt that such rights were tragically violated for much of the Soviet 
Union's history. The Baltic states were brutally incorporated into the Soviet Union during 
World War II and tragically oppressed for four decades after war. There also can be no 
reticence in condemning the violent occupation on January 20, 1990, of the Latvian Ministry 
of the Interior by troops under the command of the Moscow Ministry of the Interior, and for 
grieving for the four persons killed and others injured in that attack. Archbishop Karlis 
Gailitis of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Latvia may well be correct in his expressed 
judgment that the attack was instigated by the Communist Party because it cannot accept that 
the independence movements in the Baltic states have become the leading political forces in 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, though it is not clear whether it was the local or the Moscow 
communist authorities who commanded the attack of the 'black berets'. 
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Afte·r this is affirmed, however, the doubts begin. For the point at issue is precisely the 
locus of the "rule of law." Can the Soviet Union become a federation of relatively 
autonomous states through an orderly and legal process of negotiation? Or is it in the interest 
of their people to have it dismembered into many absolutely autonomous, sovereign states? 
In answering this question, we must be careful to distinguish their interest from our national 
interest, for its dismembering would surely leave the United States all the more securely as 
the only superpower left in the world. Though one may hesitate at the analogy, could it be 
that a hundr�d years from now Mikhail Gorbachev might be as honored as Abraham Lincoln 
now is for his determination to "save the union"? Those who wonder at the analogy will do 
well to remember that it is only now that some conservatives in our southern states finally 
find it possible to join "Lincoln's Republican Party." And are there no clear analogies, for 
all of the differences, between the Soviets' more recent history of oppression and our national 
history of the oppression of African-Americans and native Americans, to say nothing of 
other ethnic minorities? I, at least, wonder. Those of us who need not run for national 
political office, may well be more reticent about our ideological judgments. 
While in Estonia in August 1990 it was entirely clear to me that every Estonian (as well 
as every Georgian a week later) with whom we spoke wanted independence for their state. 
This certainly is also the attitude of Superintendent Olav Parnamets of the Estonian 
Methodist Church. They are now free to speak, organize and vote for it, though it remains 
to be seen how the central Soviet parliament and executive in Moscow will determine the 
"rule of law" for making such decisions in the entire Union. Yet I risked rebuke by asking 
Estonian friends whether it really is feasible for only one million Estonians with a limited 
economic base to support a fully sovereign state. It seems strange to me when I think of it 
as similar to one-third of the population of my city of Chicago declaring themselves 
"sovereign." Their national anger over past oppression must be felt and honored. Their 
nationalism may be recognized and understood. But they must be as farsighted and wise as 
possible in these dynamic times. We may best help them with questions that stimulate 
thought, rather than premature judgments that reflect our ideological interests as we support 
their "nationalism." 
Perhaps the best thing we could do to help assure that disputes like those which threaten 
the rule of law in the Baltic states are not settled by violence is to support the "Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism" outlined in the report of the CSCE Valetta Conference. The 
participatory states, including the Soviet Union, met in Valetta, Malta, January IS-February 
8, 1991, just at the time of the violence in Latvia. Over twenty participating states 
condemned the Baltic violence in their opening statements to this third CSCE meeting on the 
peaceful settlement of disputes, but the meeting did not break down in cold war polemics or 
polarization. They rather reached consensus in beginning to develop a process for peacefully 
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settling such disputes. At this writing, the Council of Ministers scheduled to meet in Berlin 
in June 1991 has not yet met, but Christian leaders would do well to urge U.S. Secretary of 
State Baker to support rapid implementation of the Valetta Report and to pledge that the 
United States would also begin to submit itself to the dispute settling processes developing 
in international law. Until and unless we urge our government to do so, we have little moral 
authority to admonish the Soviet government. 
There is a genuine fear, and perhaps the real possibility, of civil war in the Soviet Union. 
Christians should hear and ponder the word of the Soviet author Victor Konetsky reported 
in the Literary Gazette International of May 1990: 
Not long ago, in Hamburg, a German captain approached me and said, "Gorbachev­
-good man!" They believe in our bright future. Unlike me. So far it doesn't raise 
any other feeling in my soul except fear. I'll repeat: I'm really afraid of civil war, 
afraid of bloodshed .. . For me it's a serious trauma each time I have to take a trip 
outside my apartment. After which I'm unable to go on writing. Out in the streets 
of my beloved Leningrad, I find myself in an ocean of hatred. 
An 'ocean of hatred' is a very dangerous environment for human beings, and impossible for 
any society to long endure. It is a fact of my experience that President Gorbachev is more 
admired abroad than at home. His glasnost and perestroika have released a dynamic that he 
no longer seems able to lead, and this increasingly poses dangers he cannot control. It is 
simply a fact that the beginning of democracy in the Soviet Union has led to nationalistic 
chauvinism, greater economic independence has led to shortages of cheaper consumer goods 
and rising prices, and the development of entrepreneurial "cooperatives" has also allowed the 
growth of black marketing. So frustration, anger, and hatred grow apace. 
Even good changes have negative by-products. Some of the finest buildings, of course, 
used to house regional Communist Party headquarters. Now local democracy has turned them 
over to many other organizations, like the editorial offices of regional newspapers, factory 
management offices, municipal councils, etc. But none of them has sufficien:t funds or power 
to maintain the buildings. Thus the few fine buildings available are rapidly deteriorating 
into disrepair for lack of adequate maintenance. 
What is to be done? Almost the only answer heard in the U.S. media is rapid and 
complete transition to free market enterprise. I am afraid it is too ideological an answer. To 
be sure, the movement toward greater productivity through freeing up private initiative 
appears necessary. Boris Yeltsin, the president of the Russian Republic, has become the 
public champion of this proposal and the chief rival of President Gorbachev for political 
power. But would the immediate freeing up of land for private purchase and ownership lead 
to real benefit for the Soviet people, or under the present conditions of economic instability 
would it lead to skyrocketing prices in land speculation? We do not really know, but I think 
we do know that the free market requires an economic infrastructure and a social ethos that 
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cannot be acquired overnight. And without them, the free market tends toward economic 
anarchy and social Darwinism that benefits only the most powerful and unscrupulous. 
There has been a growing admiration for Mr. Yeltsin in this country that I am not sure 
is fully deserved. He is presented as the champion of freedom and democracy. But he was 
first admired in Moscow, while he was the First Secretary of the Moscow Communist Party, 
as a hands-on administrator who got things done. When he visited the telephone office in 
a new residential district, for instance, bribes no longer had to be paid to get telephones in 
new residential buildings. It is good for some purposes to be a strong administrator. But this 
is a long way from being a democratic politician. Many Russians in the present malaise 
might welcome a "strong man" who would set things right. My suspicion that this is too 
much the basis for Mr. Yeltsin's growing popularity was recently strengthened by an 
interview published in the New York Times of March 30, 1991, with Vladimir Isakov, an 
elected representative in the parliament of the Russian Republic over which Mr. Yeltsin 
presides. Mr. Isakov was elected from President Yeltsin's home city of Sverdlovsk as his 
strong supporter. But he has grown increasingly critical, because he claims, "Mr. Yeltsin 
circumvents constitutionally elected officials, like himself, and relies improperly on a small 
coterie of aides with no parliamentary standing." We must at least be careful not to try to 
help choose Soviet political and economic leadership from too great a distance largely on the 
basis of our ideology. I, for one, simply do not yet know whether the political styles and 
economic plans of President Yeltsin or President Gorbachev hold the most promise for the 
well-being of the Soviet people. 
It is clear that there are great wounds remembers with great pain that require healing. 
Many of them have a religious dimension. Christopher Leighton, executive director of the 
Institute for Christian-Jewish Studies in Baltimore, Maryland, discovered this while dealing 
with the issue of anti-semitism in the Soviet Union in June 1990. He reported the response 
of Archbishop Alexander, rector of the Russian Orthodox Theological Academy in 
Zagorsk/Moscow, when the issue of Jewish freedom was raised: 
Do you think that we have not also suffered? Twenty-seven million lost in the Great 
Patriotic War. As many as forty million murdered in Stalin's purges. Why single 
out the Jews for special treatment, as though their suffering counts for more? There 
are other ethnic groups that continue to endure horrendous oppression. The danger 
is that we will cling to our separate ways and fail to overcome our differences. We 
must journey beyond our particularities, transcend divisive national affiliations, and 
find unity in our spiritual journey to God. 2 
An even more divisive and overtly conflictual issue is the present struggle between the 
newly freed Byzantine-Rite Catholic (Uniate) and Orthodox churches in the Ukraine. It is 
20ccasional Papers on Rel igion in Eastern Europe, Vol. XI, No. I (February 1991), p. 26. 
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clear that the oppressive political force used after World War II to "unite" the Uniate churches 
in the Orthodox Church should be, and is being, reversed. It seems equally clear that the 
whole concept of the Ukrainian Catholic church as "Uniate" was wrong from its beginning 
centuries ago, when it treated the Orthodox Church as though it were not a sister church of 
grace and salvation. Providentially, there has been an active Dialog-Commission of Orthodox 
and Roman Catholic churches for the last decade. In their sixth session, meeting in Freising, 
Germany, in June 1990, they urged their communicants to stope "all use of force--indirect 
or direct, physical �r moral," and urged that " . . .  dialogue is the most adequate means for 
reaching unity, and is at the same time also the best method for solving all problems."3 
This commitment to dialogue fits the "analysis" that Archpriest Vitali Borovoi of the 
Russian Orthodox Church contributed to the seventh discussion between representatives of 
his church and the Federation of Evangelical Churches of the former German Democratic 
Republic in October 1990 on "Renewal of Christianity and Society." He catted for nothing 
less than a conversion from any theological or political "maximalism" that derives from any 
form of abstract utopianism, which he analyzed in the Byzantine history of his own church 
and the Marxist ideology of the recent Soviet governments, and then concluded. 
"A necessary condition of any renewal is the decisive, authentic and irreversible rejection of 
every utopian maximalism in our future programs and goals."4 
I think this is also a good word for us with which to conclude. For as Christians we share 
his concern for the renewal of his very complex Soviet society. Let us beware and forego 
any "analysis" dependent on the maximalizing of our own ideology, and remain open to 
continuing dialogue with what for many North Americans are our newly found Soviet 
neighbors. 
3Stimme der Orthodoxie, December 1990, p. 32. My translation. 
4Stimme der Orthodoxie, January 1991 ,  p. I I .  My translation. 
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